For those interested in attending the Symposium on “Restricted Spaces: Civil Society and Authoritarianism in Africa,” co-organized by Cornell Institute for African Development (CIAD) and the Sahel Consortium at Cornell Universitry on April 26-27, 2019, please see the direction and the schedule at the link below. The adimission is free. For information please contact Ms. Jackie Sayegh, CIAD Program Manager, at firstname.lastname@example.org.
Call for Proposals for a Symposium Sponsored by the Cornell Institute for African Development (IAD) and Sahel Consortium
April 26-27, 2019 Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
Many governments around the globe have intensified restrictions on civil society. Authoritarian governments, in particular, are becoming more forceful in limiting civic space and in violating international norms which protect freedom of association. From 2015 to 2016 alone, 64 restrictive laws were adopted on civil society in both democratic and undemocratic countries (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law). The Washington-based International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, or ICNL, has identified 120 laws and regulations that have been enacted by 70 governments since 2012 that limit NGOs’ access to financing and the ability of citizens to organize and manage them.
“We’ve seen a paradigm shift in the view of civil society in the past 20 years,” says David Moore, ICNL’s vice president for legal affairs. “There is a perception, promoted by some governments, that civil society is somehow ‘other,’ seeking to undermine national goals and priorities.” According to the USAID Sustainability Index for SubSaharan Africa “ in many countries, civil society, especially those engaged in advocacy or human rights work, face significant and often vague restrictions on their operations.”
The Institute for African Development (IAD) and the Sahel Consortium symposium committee invite submissions of abstracts on the above mentioned theme. Proposals must be no more than a page in length; single spaced, and must have the name, title, and institutional or organizational affiliation and full contact details of the person or persons submitting the abstract. Deadline for the submission of proposals/abstracts in January 30, 2019. Submitted proposals should be sent to Jackie Sayegh email@example.com at the Institute for African Development (IAD).
For more information, contact Jackie Sayegh, Program Manager, Institute for African Development, 190 Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, tel: (607) 255-6849 / e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org. To read more go to:
For more than two and half decades, precisely between 1985 and 2011, Mali experienced rapid economic growth. For instance, between 1985 and 1994, Mali’s GDP grew at an average rate of 1.7 per cent; 5.8 per cent between 1995 and 2005 and at 4.9 per cent between 2007 and 2010, while annual GDP growth was 2.7 per cent in 2011. On the one hand, this economic growth was occasioned by a flourishing democracy and socio-political stability, which made the country “an acclaimed example of democratic process in the West African sub-region.” On the other hand, flourishing democracy, socio-political stability and the resultant economic growth in Mali were results of the successes in regional integration recorded within the West African sub-region by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Following decades of instability arising from a series of political upheavals, sporadic violent social conflicts and civil wars in West Africa, the emphasis in the sub-region shifted in the mid-1990s, from economic cooperation to peace-building and security cooperation. This was due to the realisation that there is a dialectical relationship among security, peace, political stability, and economic growth and that economic cooperation cannot be fostered on a conflict-ridden environment. However, the flourishing democracy, socio-political stability and economic growth experienced in Mali in particular and the success in regional integration recorded by ECOWAS within the sub-region in general, have come under threats by the resurgence of political conflicts and secessionist tendencies in Mali, military coup d’état in Burkina Faso and electoral violence in Gabon, among others.
OGBONNAYA, Ufiem Maurice
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The purpose of this is paper is to contribute to the many endeavors to break the vicious circle of conflict, disease, poverty and the cycle of famine in Africa. It suggests that the continent make the best use of the very weakness of its state structures by re-conceptualizing a development whose sustainability is based on an integrated and collective management of river systems. To this end, one needs to rethink and reformulate issues that are creating conflict on the continent and redesign new forms of cooperation.
Since the 1960s wave of African independence, whenever political arrangements fail to fulfill their intended purposes, the French response to deviant actors has resulted in over 100 French military interventions in Africa with stabilizing consequences in some cases and destabilizing outcomes in others. French logic for intervention has been two-fold: reactionary and preventive. The reactionary mode is to maintain the status quo with France as regional hegemon in sub-Saharan Africa and as major player in the global arena. The preventive mode is to deter competitors and outside threats to its national interests in the region. It is a model of an economy of forces whereby soft and hard power are combined and deployed to achieve results with maximum efficiency and minimum resources. More than half a century after independence, Francophone sub-Saharan Africa virtually functions as an extension of France’s national territory. This illustrates the fact that actual boundaries of nations depend less on physical size than on influence and the capacity of force projection. France’s role in world affairs
exemplifies this assertion.
“Launched in February 2017, the G5 Sahel joint force is an experiment in a region crowded by sometimes-competing military and diplomatic initiatives. Weapons and money will not be enough to resolve the Sahel’s crises, so the force must win the trust and support of both local populations and regional powers.”
The international Crisis Group offers an insightful analysis of the G5 Sahel joint force (FC-G5S), as the new initiative undertaken by Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad is taking shape.
The full article can be accessed at: